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Are 'here' and 'now' indexicals? 
 
François Recanati 
Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS) 






I. Indexicals, intentionals, and mixed cases 
 
§1.1 Indexicals and intentionals 
 
'I' refers to the speaker, 'today' refers to the day in which the utterance takes 
place, 'tomorrow' refers to the day following the day on which the utterance 
takes place... Those expressions are (pure) indexicals. Their reference 
depends upon the context of use, and their linguistic meaning determines 
what their reference is in a given context of use. For each indexical, there is 
a token-reflexive rule which determines what that indexical refers to as a 
function of what Kaplan calls "brute facts of the context": who speaks, 
when, etc. The rule in question constitutes the linguistic meaning (the 
'character') of the indexical. 
 Other expressions such as the third person pronoun 'he' or the 
demonstrative 'that' share with indexicals the property that their reference 
depends upon the context. But there is no rule which determines what the 
reference is in a given context. The speaker is free to refer to what he wants 
by using 'that'. Of course there are constraints which limit that freedom. 
Thus the reference of 'he' must be a male individual; that constraint is 
linguistically encoded, hence I will call it the linguistic constraint. The 
linguistic constraint is far from being uniquely-determining, however: any 
male individual can be referred to by means of 'he'. In the case of a pure 
indexical like 'I', the constraint is uniquely-determining. Only the speaker 
can be referred to by means of 'I'. 
 To sum up, the reference of an indexical is determined by a token-
reflexive rule which is (part of) the meaning or character of the expression. 
In contrast, the reference of an intentional (as I will call the other sort of 
context-dependent expression) essentially depends upon the speaker's 
intentions. Intentionals are like free variables. One might attempt to 
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downplay the difference between indexicals and intentionals by pointing 
out that there is a rule which determines the reference of an intentional in 
context: the rule that an intentional refers to whichever object meets both 
the linguistic constraint (e.g. being male) and  a pragmatic constraint 
(being what the speaker intends to refer to). In other words, the speaker's 
intention may be considered as the crucial contextual factor on which the 
reference of an intentional depends, just as the reference of an indexical 
depends upon factors such as the identity of the speaker or the time of 
utterance. 
 If we take this line, the difference between indexicals and 
intentionals is not abolished. It becomes a difference between expressions 
whose reference depends upon brute facts of the context (independent of 
the speaker's intentions), and expressions whose reference depends upon 
the speaker's referential intentions. Be that as it may, I prefer to talk of a 
reference-determining 'rule' only when the linguistically encoded constraint 
suffices to determine the reference. Thus in the case of 'I' the constraint is 
that the referent be the speaker. That constraint suffices to determine the 
reference. In the case of 'he', the constraint is that the referent be male. That 
constraint does not suffice to determine the reference: The speaker's 
intentions must be appealed to. 
 
§1.2 Impure indexicals 
 
The meaning of an intentional only constrains the reference, it does not 
fully determine it. Moreover, in general at least, the constraint is not token-
reflexive. The constraint that the reference of 'I' be the speaker (the person 
uttering this token) is token-reflexive, but the constraint that the reference 
of 'he' be male is not. 
 Let me now introduce an intermediate category of mixed cases. 
Impure indexicals, as I call them, are intentionals in the sense that their 
linguistic meaning does not determine, but merely constrains, their 
reference; which reference therefore depends upon the speaker's intentions. 
But the constraint is token-reflexive: this makes them very similar to 
indexicals — whence the name 'impure indexicals'. 
 As an illustration, consider the first-person plural pronoun 'we'. It is 
an intentional: in a given context, 'we' refers to a group of people which is 
constrained but not determined by the linguistic meaning of 'we'. 
Ultimately it is the speaker's intentions which determine which group a 
given occurrence of 'we' refers to. But the reference has to satisfy a 
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constraint: the group in question has to contain the speaker among its 
members. So both in the case of 'I' and in the case of 'we' the reference 
must bear a certain relation to the speaker: being identical to him or her in 
the case of 'I', containing him or her among its members in the case of 'we'. 
But the relation is one-one only in the case of 'I'. Since several groups of 
people can contain the speaker among their members, the constraint is not 
uniquely-determining in the case of 'we' and we need the speaker's 
intentions to fix the reference. 
 To sum up, there are three sub-categories within the broad category 
of 'indexicals' in the traditional sense (context-dependent expressions): 
pure indexicals like 'I' and 'tomorrow'; pure intentionals like 'she', where 
the referential constraint is not token-reflexive; and impure indexicals like 
'we', which are intentionals but where the referential constraint is token-
reflexive (Fig. 1). 
 
Context-dependent expressions
Indexicals                       Intentionals
Pure indexicals        Impure indexicals        Pure  intentionals





II. Problems with 'here' and 'now' 
 
§2.1 The 'vagueness' problem 
 
What about 'here' and 'now'? They are standardly treated as pure indexicals. 
Much as 'I' refers to the speaker, 'now' is said to refer to the time of 
utterance and 'here' to the place of utterance. But there is a well-known 
difficulty: the so-called vagueness of 'here' and 'now'. 'Here' and 'now' can 
refer to temporal or spatial regions of any size, provided the region in 
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question contains the utterance. This suggests that 'here' and 'now' may 
be best treated as impure rather than pure indexicals. 
 On the impure-indexical analysis 'now' is linguistically constrained 
to refer to a time interval including the moment of utterance. That 
constraint is token-reflexive, but it does not suffice to determine the 
reference, because there are many time intervals of varying lengths that 
include the moment of utterance. The same thing holds for 'here'. It refers 
to a place in which the utterance is tokened, but there are many such 
places. Thus this very utterance takes place in this room, but it takes place 
also in Trento, in Italy, etc.1 So it seems that 'here' and 'now' are impure 
indexicals, like 'we'. The reference is constrained to bear a certain relation 
to the utterance: it must contain it temporally or spatially. But that relation 
is many-one, hence 'here' and 'now' are not pure indexicals. Their reference 
depends upon the speaker's intentions. 
 Still, one may insist that 'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals and 
make the token-reflexive constraint uniquely-determining. For example, 
one may claim that 'now' refers to the (exact) time of utterance, that is, to 
the minimal interval of time which contains the totality of the utterance 
event. On this analysis 'now' is a pure indexical. Its reference is no longer 
constrained to contain the moment of utterance (something which many 
time intervals do), but to be the moment of utterance. The encoded relation 
is now one-one rather than many-one. 
 At this point, of course, we must explain why 'now' can refer not 
only to the exact time of utterance, but also to periods of any length 
including it, as when we say 'We are happier now than we were last year'. 
One option consists in appealing to the notion of extended use. I can use 
'today' not in the literal sense but in an extended sense to refer to a period 
of time much longer than a day. (As in 'Today, most people live in big 
cities'.) The problematic uses of 'now' can be treated similarly as extended 
uses, to be accounted for within pragmatics rather than within semantics. 
 The first option (the impure-indexical analysis) seems to me much 
better than the second one. For there is a difference between 'now' and 
'today'. It is analytic that today is a day: the nature of the period of time 
referred to is linguistically encoded. There is no difference between 'today' 
and 'Wednesday' or 'Saturday' in that respect. Since that is so, it makes 
sense to treat uses in which 'today' refers to a different type of period (e.g. 
an era or a century) as deviant or extended. But with 'now', it is far from 
                                           
1 This paper originates from a talk delivered in Trento (Italy) in September 1999. 
 5 
obvious that the nature of the period is linguistically encoded; hence it is 
somewhat arbitrary to rule out certain uses, but not others, as deviant and 
extended. Moreover, we can hardly do with 'here' what we have just done 
with 'now'. For what is the minimal place of utterance? Is it the minimal 
space occupied by the speaker's feet? The notion of 'place of utterance' 
seems to be inherently vague, in contrast to the notion of 'day of utterance', 
which is quite precise. 
 
§2.2 Recorded messages 
 
There are other difficulties for the view that 'here' and 'now' are pure 
indexicals. A well-known case is 'I am not here now' recorded on an 
answering machine. By 'now' the speaker refers to a time later than the 
moment of utterance, namely the time when someone will listen to the 
recorded message. The period referred to does not even contain the 
moment of utterance here, so this type of example threatens not only the 
view that 'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals, referring to the time and 
place of utterance respectively, but also the view that they are impure 
indexicals referring to a time or place containing the time or place of 
utterance. How can we handle such cases? 
 Here again we have two options (Recanati 1995). One is this: we can 
formulate the token-reflexive rule as the rule that 'now' refers to the time at 
which the message is delivered. In a normal situation of communication 
(face to face) the time of delivery is the time of utterance. But in a situation 
of delayed communication, the notion of 'delivery' becomes vague and 
equivocal. Is the message delivered when it's issued or when it's received? 
Both interpretations are legitimate. It follows that 'now' can refer either to 
the time of utterance or to the time of reception. On this view token-
reflexive rule there is, but its interpretation is not fully determinate, or 
rather it's determinate only in prototypical situations of face-to-face 
communication. In situations of delayed communication, the reference 
cannot be determined by appealing solely to the linguistically encoded 
constraint. The speaker's intentions must help resolve the indeterminacy in 
the interpretation of the constraint. This sort of case can therefore be 
thought to provide a second reason for saying that 'here' and 'now' are 
impure rather than pure indexicals. 
 But there is an alternative option. Once again we can dispose of that 
type of case by appealing to the notion of a deviant or extended use. In 
quotation, in fiction, in irony, and in a number of other cases, we pretend 
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that the context is different from what it actually is, and we use the 
pretend context to determine the reference of indexicals (Recanati 2000). 
Thus, in a novel, 'I' refers to a fictional character, namely the narrator, 
rather than to the actual author of the fiction. This is an instance of context-
shift. 
 There is context-shift whenever the context used in evaluating a 
expression is not the context of utterance but an alternative, imaginary 
context. A good example is provided by the following instance of so-called 
free indirect speech: 
 
After a while, she gave her response. Tomorrow, she would meet me 
with pleasure; but she was too busy now. 
 
The speaker, say John, reports an utterance by Mary in response to John's 
earlier query. 'Tomorrow' refers to the day following that of the reported 
utterance, not to the day following that of the report. Both 'tomorrow' and 
'now' are evaluated with respect to the reportee's context. Other elements in 
the sentence, however, are evaluated with respect to the speaker's actual 
context. This is an important feature of context-shifts: they can be local and 
selective. 
 Using this tool, we may say that in the recorded message example 
the speaker projects herself into the hearer's shoes so that his context (the 
hearer's context) becomes relevant for the evaluation of the indexical 'now'. 
 
§2.3 Shifted uses of 'here' and 'now' 
 
If one looks at a big corpus, one realizes that there is a very large class of 
similar counterexamples to the standard indexical analysis of 'here' and 
'now'; that is, very many cases in which 'now' does not refer to a time 
interval including the time of utterance, and 'here' to a place where the 
utterance is located. Yet those further counterexamples cannot be disposed 
of by appealing to the impure-indexical analysis in the way that can be 
done for disposing of the recorded-message counterexample. In his paper 
'Utterance, Interpretation, and the Logic of Indexicals' (Predelli 1998), 
Stefano Predelli gives the following examples in which 'now' and 'here' are 




In the summer of 1829, Aloysia Lange, née Weber, visits Mary 
Novello in her hotel room in Vienna... Aloysia, the once celebrated 
singer, now an old lady of sixty-seven... gives Mary the impression of 
a broken woman lamenting her fate 
 
If an entire neighborhood could qualify as an outdoor museum, the 
Mount Washington district would probably charge admission. Here, 
just northwest of downtown, are several picture-book expressions of 
desert culture within a few blocks. 
 
As Predelli points out, 
 
'now' in the passage on Aloysia refers neither to the time of encoding 
(when the book was written) nor to the time of decoding (when I read 
it), and 'here' in [the other passage] picks up neither the author's home 
nor the location of the reader. (Predelli 1998: 407) 
 
The only available solution in such cases seems to be to appeal to the 
notion of context-shift (or to Predelli's equivalent notions). This analysis 
seems fully justified for if we look at the first example, we notice the use of 
the 'historical present'. This is a rhetorical device by means of which we 
'presentify' the scene we are reporting. No less than free indirect speech, 
historical present involves something like mental projection. It is not 
surprising that occurrences of 'now' can be found in such passages. We 
pretend that the scene described is presently happening before our eyes. It 
is therefore natural to use 'now' to refer to the time of the scene. 
 
§2.4 Summing up 
 
Let us take stock. There are examples that clearly tell against the view that 
'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals. The so-called 'vagueness' examples fall 
into that category. Attempts to protect the pure indexical analysis from 
such counterexamples by appealing to pragmatic notions such as that of an 
extended use are not convincing. Other counterexamples are more 
threatening because they cast doubt on the indexical analysis generally: 
they show that the reference of 'here' and 'now' need not be a place or a 
time interval including the time or place at which the utterance takes place. 
Can we protect the indexical analysis from such counterexamples? It seems 
that we can, by appealing to notions such as that of a context-shift. Yet, I 
 8 
will argue, that defense is not without its problems and we may 
ultimately have to give up the view that 'here' and 'now' are indexicals, 
whether pure or impure. 
 
 
III. 'Here' and 'now' as (pure) intentionals 
 
§3.1 Allegedly shifted uses of 'here' and 'now' in dry encyclopedia articles 
 
Let us consider Predelli's first example again. As I pointed out, the 
occurrence of historical present in that passage sufficiently establishes that 
something like mental projection operates; this, of course, supports 
Predelli's analysis in terms of context-shift. Yet it is important to realize 
that similar uses of 'now' can occur even in the absence of historical present 
or of any other device (or symptom) of mental projection. Thus we may 
replace the present tense in Predelli's example by the past tense throughout 
without any problem: 
 
In the summer of 1829, Aloysia Lange, née Weber, visited Mary 
Novello in her hotel room in Vienna... Aloysia, the once celebrated 
singer, now an old lady of sixty-seven... gave Mary the impression of 
a broken woman lamenting her fate 
 
The dramatization introduced by the historical present is no longer there. 
The whole scene is reported using past tense. Still, 'now' is used. One may 
argue that in the above example of free indirect speech also we find 
occurrences of 'now' in conjunction with the past tense, referring to what 
was the present at the time in the past when the reported episode took 
place. But it would be a mistake to consider an example like this one as 
similar to free indirect speech and other cases in which a context-shift 
occurs. It is only superficially similar. 
 In free indirect speech, a context-shift is operative so that one can 
e.g. use 'tomorrow' to refer to the day following the reported scene (rather 
than the day following the report). The shift is prepared and indicated by 
various rhetorical devices which tend to facilitate a process of mental 
projection. One cannot find such shifted uses of 'tomorrow' outside very 
specific literary settings. This immediately raises an objection to a Predelli-
type analysis. For allegedly shifted uses of 'here' and 'now' can be found all 
over the place. Even in dry encyclopedia articles they are everywhere. But 
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we do not find a single use of 'today' or 'tomorrow' evaluated with respect 
to a context distinct from the context of utterance outside restricted literary 
contexts (except, of course, in direct quotation). This asymmetry must be 
accounted for. To account for it, I suggest an alternative approach to the 
allegedly shifted uses of 'here' and 'now'. On this approach, the relevant 
uses of 'here' and 'now' do not really involve a context-shift. They are not 
extended or special — they are normal uses. 
 
§3.2 Demonstrative uses of 'here' 
 
Before proceeding, let me mention another group of examples which raise 
difficulties for the indexical analysis of 'here' and 'now': the so-called 
demonstrative uses of 'here'. For example, I can point to Germany on a map 
and say: 'Joseph is here now'. My utterance does not take place in 
Germany, hence the token-reflexive constraint (to be or contain the place 
of utterance) is not satisfied by the reference: Germany. 
 It may be that, following Nunberg, we must draw a distinction 
between index (demonstratum) and reference, in such a case. Then the spot 
on the map will be the index, and Germany the reference. Perhaps it is the 
index, rather than the ultimate reference, which must satisfy the constraint. 
Can this distinction help? Well, the spot on the map is indeed much closer 
to the place of utterance than Germany is. But the spot on the map neither 
is nor contains the place of utterance. (It's just the opposite that seems to be 
true: The place of utterance, if we construe it broadly enough, includes the 
spot on the map: for the utterance takes place in this room, the map itself is 
in this room, and the spot is on the map.) Clearly, then, the token-reflexive 
constraint is not satisfied, whether we construe it strictly or loosely. 'Here' 
seems to be used as a demonstrative, equivalent to 'this place', with the 
reference fixed by the speaker's intentions externalised by a pointing 
gesture. 
 Faced with such uses, some say that 'here' is ambiguous. On one 
reading 'here' is an indexical, characterized by a token-reflexive rule. The 
reference of 'here', so construed, must be a location where the utterance 
takes place. On another reading, 'here' is a demonstrative. It refers to a 
place determined by the speaker's intentions, but the place in question does 
not have to satisfy the token-reflexive constraint which characterizes 
indexical uses. The place referred to does not have to contain the utterance, 
on the demonstrative uses. 
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 Yet many theorists do not like to posit ambiguities and prefer 
unified accounts whenever possible. Can we avoid positing an ambiguity, 
in the case of 'here'? One solution would be to loosen the token-reflexive 
constraint and say that 'here' refers to a place which either is, or contains, 
or is in the vicinity of the place where the utterance takes place. The more 
we loosen the token-reflexive constraint in this manner, the more impure 
the indexical becomes. Another, more radical solution is this: we can give 
up the view that 'here' is an indexical, and construe it as a pure intentional 
in all its uses. It is that radical solution which I would like to pursue here. 
 So far we have considered only two theories for 'here' and 'now': the 
pure-indexical theory, and the impure-indexical theory. We have not yet 
considered pure-intentional theories of 'here' and 'now'; nor have such 
theories ever been put forward in the literature, to my knowledge. I wonder 
why, because that sort of theory seems to me very promising. In particular, 
it enables us to account for the Predelli type of example in a very 
satisfactory manner. 
 
§3.3 'Here' and 'now': sketch of a demonstrative analysis 
 
Take the Encyclopedia Britannica or any similar corpus. Check all 
occurrences of 'here' and 'now' — there are plenty. Most of them will be 
prima facie counterexamples to the claim that 'here' refers to the place of 
utterance and 'now' to the time of utterance. It will be found that 'here' can 
refer to any previously mentioned place provided it is contrasted with 
another place considered as more remote for one reason or another. 
Similarly for 'now': it can refer to any period, provided it is contrasted with 
another, more distant period. In other words, 'here' essentially contrasts 
with 'there', and 'now' with 'then'. The contrast is relative. When 
considering two times, or two places, if one is thought of as closer (to us, 
or to an arbitrary reference point) than the other, we can refer to the closer 
one as 'now' or 'here'. Thus in the above example what is relevant is the 
contrast: "Aloysia, the once celebrated singer, now an old lady of sixty-
seven..." In Predelli's Mount Washington district example, a place is 
referred to as 'here' presumably in contrast to the other places that were 
previously mentioned in the guide before that one came to the fore. 
 I do not wish to deny that there is a certain sense of 'presence' or 
'givenness' that is associated with 'here' and 'now'. I am only saying that the 
constraint on the reference of 'here' and 'now' is much weaker than the 
standard indexical analysis suggests: the only constraint is that the place or 
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time referred to be close, in a sense which need not be absolute but may 
be as relative as you wish. The place of utterance and the time of utterance 
have this feature par excellence; and whenever we engage in mental 
simulation and pretend that some place or time is the place or time of 
utterance, the place or time in question thereby acquires the relevant 
feature of proximality. But any place or time, if it is closer than some other 
place or time in a relevant contrast pair, can be referred to by 'here' or 
'now'. It will be 'close' in a relative sense, and that is enough. For example, 
we can contrast two times, say one million years ago and two hundred 
million years ago. In that context, it will be possible to refer to the former 
as 'now'. For example: "Two hundred million years ago, such and such was 
(or: had been) the case. Now the situation was completely different." 
 In this framework, it is not surprising if 'here' has demonstrative 
uses. It is a demonstrative — a proximal place-demonstrative, meaning: 
this place or at this place, in contrast to 'there' which is a distal place-
demonstrative, meaning: that place or at that place. Similarly, 'now' is a 
proximal time-demonstrative, meaning this time or at this time, in contrast 
to the distal time-demonstrative 'then' which means that time or at that 
time. If I am right, the proximal/distal contrast is exactly the same across 
the variety of demonstrative pairs: 
 
 This   Here   Now 
 ------  = ------  = ------ 
 That   There  Then 
 
 
§3.4 Perspective point vs. utterance point 
 
At this point it may be doubted that the new analysis we arrive at is a 
genuine alternative to the indexical analysis. What does 'close' means, if 
not 'close to us', that is, close to the speaker (or, perhaps, to the hearer)? Is 
not the proximality constraint a token-reflexive constraint? If that is so, 
then we are back to the view that 'here' and 'now' (and also 'this') are 
impure indexicals. 
 But we do not have to analyse proximality in this manner. Consider 
the well-known contrast between 'come' and 'go'. It is often taken to be part 
of the meaning of 'come' that the target place (the destination) must be 
where the speaker is. I would rather say that it must be 'close' (proximal), 
but here as elsewhere 'close' does not necessarily mean 'close to the 
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speaker'. One does not want to treat as extended or special an utterance of 
'I will come to your party' in which the hearer's point of view predominates. 
The notion of context-shift is trivialized if we apply it here. It is simply not 
true that 'come' denotes a movement to the place where the speaker is; that 
is only one possible use compatible with the meaning of 'come'. One 
should rather say: 'come' denotes a movement to a place which is proximal 
in the sense of 'close to the perspective point', but the perspective point 
need not coincide with the location of the speaker or with what Austin used 
to call the 'utterance point'. We have such flexibility in varying the 
perspective point in speech that it is better to treat the perspective point as 
an independent parameter, distinct from the parameters relevant to the 
evaluation of indexicals. 
 David Lewis gives the following example of a shift in perspective 
point involving the verb 'come': 
 
When the beggars came to town, the rich folk went to the shore. But 
soon the beggars came after them, so they went home. 
 
The perspective point is first located in town; but in the second sentence 
the perspective point has followed the rich folk out of town. It is, therefore, 
their perspective that is expressed in this two-sentence passage. As Lewis 
points out, "in third-person narrative, whether fact or fiction, the chosen 
point of reference may have nothing to do with the speaker's or the hearer's 
location" (Lewis 1983: 243). Similarly, I think, the sort of 'proximality' that 
is involved in the analysis of the pairs 'here/there', 'now/then', and 'this/that' 
has to be understood as closeness to the perspective point, rather than as 
closeness to the utterance point. Closeness to the utterance point is only a 
special case, that in which the utterance point and the perspective point 
coincide. Thus I concur with Kamp and Reyle when they argue that the 
constraint on the reference of 'now' is not that the described eventuality 
must overlap with the utterance time, but that it must overlap with what 




'Here' and 'now' are intentionals. To determine their reference one must 
appeal to the intentions of the speaker. If 'here' and 'now' are indexicals, 
therefore, they are impure indexicals. The constraint on the reference 
which the expression encodes is not uniquely-determining. 
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 Are 'here' and 'now' indexicals? Only if the constraint they encode 
is token-reflexive. I argued that the constraint in question is a proximality 
constraint, the same one that is encoded by the demonstrative 'this' or the 
verb 'come'. That constraint need not be construed as token-reflexive, I 
claimed. It is relative to the perspective point rather than to the utterance 
point. 
 If I am right, there is in the language a perspectival system, in virtue 
of which, when a scene is described, it is described from a certain point of 
view — a point of view which need not be that of anyone in the situation of 
utterance. The perspectival system is distinct from the indexical system, in 
virtue of which the reference of certain expressions is a function of features 
of the situation of utterance. 
 It may be that the perspectival system evolved from the indexical 
system. Prototypically the perspective point and the utterance point 
coincide. Deviations from the prototype, that is, cases in which they do not 
coincide, may be explained diachronically in terms of context-shift. One 
can project oneself into someone else's shoes, hence adopt the perspective 
of some other agent. But what may have started as extended use of the 
indexical system has stabilized as an independent system: the perspectival 
system. As a result, there is nothing special or deviant about the use of 
'now' to refer to a time in the past, no need to appeal to pragmatic 
mechanisms such as context-shifting to account for such uses. In contrast, 
there is something special about using 'today' or 'tomorrow' to refer to a day 
in the past. In view of the big statistical difference between the sorts of use, 
I think we may tentatively conclude that 'here' and 'now' are perspectivals 





Kamp, H. and U. Reyle: From Discourse to Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Kaplan, D. 1989: "Demonstratives". In J. Almog, H. Wettstein and J. Perry 
(eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 481-
563. 
 
Lewis, D. 1983: "Scorekeeping in a Language Game". In his Philosophical 
Papers, vol.1, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.233-249. 
 
 14 
Nunberg, G. 1993: "Indexicality and Deixis". Linguistics and 
Philosophy, 16, pp. 1-43. 
 
Predelli, S. 1998: "Utterance, Interpretation, and the Logic of Indexicals". 
Mind and Language, 13, pp. 400-414. 
 
Recanati, F. 1995: "Le présent épistolaire: une perspective cognitive". 
L'Information grammaticale 66: 38-44. 
 
Recanati, F. 2000: Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta. An Essay on 
Metarepresentation. Cambridge, Mass. 
